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I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, like the other federal circuit
courts, is caught up in a confusing debate over the correct standard
for appellate review of Fourth Amendment seizure determinations.
The seizure determination alone has proven to be a difficult issue.,
Adding different standards of review into the formula has turned
confusion into chaos. There is conflict both among the circuits, and
within the Eighth Circuit itself.2
In United States v. McKines, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was
sharply divided on the issue, but held that the proper standard of
appellate review for seizure determinations is de novo.3 The court
made three arguments supporting the de novo standard of review.
First, de novo review is consistent with United States Supreme Court
decisions.4 Second, de novo review helps to ensure consistent appli-
cation of the seizure test. 5 Third, the seizure question is a "legal
characterization that must be reviewed de novo." 6
This Case Note argues that McKines incorrectly characterized the
seizure determination as a question for independent review. In-
stead, the seizure determination should be reviewed for clear error,
with proper deference being given to the district court's findings.
Although McKines found otherwise, the Supreme Court has not de-
cided that the correct standard of review is de novo. Likewise, there
is no authority for labeling the seizure determination as a legal ques-
tion. McKines recognizes that uniformity and predictability in the law
are desirable. My theme is simple: while uniformity and predictabil-
ity are desirable, they are not attainable in the area of Fourth
Amendment Seizure. The Supreme Court has stated that the deci-
sion as to the proper standard of appellate review "turn[s] on a de-
termination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice,
one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the is-
1. See United States v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (stating that the
seizure test "is necessarily imprecise because it is designed to assess the coercive
effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of
that conduct in isolation"); United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1416 (8th Cir.)
(en banc) (stating that imprecision is inherent in the test for a Fourth Amendment
seizure), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 593 (1991).
2. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1432 (Lay, CJ., dissenting) ("the law in this area is in
total disarray").
3. Id. at 1426 (Gibson, J., concurring specially). The majority of the court up-
held the finding that no seizure had occurred under the application of either the
clearly erroneous standard or the de novo review standard.
4. Id. at 1424 ("Although the Supreme Court has not stated [that de novo is the
standard,] its approach and analysis demonstrate that it has applied the de novo
standard.")
5. Id. at 1425-26.
6. Id. at 1426.
[Vol. 18
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sue in question."7 It is precisely this concern for the sound adminis-
tration ofjustice that makes the district court best suited to make the
seizure determination.
8
This Case Note examines the history of the standard of review for
seizure issues, formulates a framework for determining an appropri-
ate standard of review, and recommends adoption of the clearly er-
roneous standard. Part II provides background information on both
standards of review and Fourth Amendment seizure. Part III out-
lines the divisive holding of United States v. McKines. Part IV explores
the problem and specifically outlines why clearly erroneous is the ap-
propriate standard of review. In conclusion, Part V recommends
that the Eighth Circuit reconsider its position on this issue.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Purpose of Appellate Review and the Need for a Standard
The American judicial system recognizes that judges and juries
make mistakes by providing redress through appeal to higher courts.
The appellate process regulates the government's dealings with its
citizens, gains their cooperation and respect, and permits the opera-
tion of a rule of law instead of a rule of men.9 The appellate process
corrects improper dispositions by a trial court but does not guaran-
tee that trials will be error-free.' 0 The appellate process also pro-
motes harmony and uniformity among the courts I and fills gaps in
the law.12
The need for a standard of review is obvious considering the sys-
tem's objectives of finality and efficiency.t3 A standard of review
promotes finality by ensuring that, at some point, the appeal process
ends.14 For example, certainty in factual determinations is impossi-
7. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
8. See Keith R. Dolliver, Comment, Voluntariness of Confessions in Habeas Corpus
Proceedings: The Proper Standard for Appellate Review, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 141 (1990) (ad-
vancing arguments that appellate courts should abandon de novo review of habeas
corpus proceedings and apply the clearly erroneous standard).
9. MARSHALL Hours ET AL., ART OF ADVOCACY-APPEALS § 1.11 (1991).
10. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE
397 (1989).
11. Hours, supra note 9, § 1.1 1. The purpose of uniformity is to ensure that "a
man's justice" does not depend upon the luck of his location but, instead, upon the
force of uniform law which applies to all citizens alike, regardless of the whim of the
particular person sitting for the moment in the role of trial judge. Id. § 1.11[2].
12. Id. The appellate process allows appellate judges to announce new law from
time to time. This allows for elaboration, clarification and expansion of existing law
which may arise from social, economic, and political changes. Id. at § 1.11 [3].
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ble,'5 but limiting reversal to only those situations where clear error
has been shown discourages the number of appeals. 16 The standard
of review also promotes efficiency.17 When the trial court and appel-
late court are equally competent to decide an issue, setting a stan-
dard that limits review increases respect for lower court judgments
and also discourages appeals.1a
A standard of review is a guidepost for appellate courts in ap-
proaching the issues before it. The standard of review frames the
arguments and the court's analytical response, and defines the power
distribution between the reviewing and lower courts. 19 It describes
approximately where, on a continuum ranging from 100% substitu-
tion ofjudgment to total deference, the intensity of review lies for a
particular issue.20
B. Standards of Review
Currently, there are four standards of review: clearly erroneous,
substantial evidence, de novo, and abuse of discretion. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure define the clearly erroneous standard21 and
require the trial court to state separately its factual findings and con-
clusions of law.22 The United States Supreme Court has stated, "A
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to sup-
port it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."23
Where the evidence supports more than one conclusion, a choice
between two permissible views is not clear error. 24 Thus, the appel-
late court may not reject the trial court's findings simply because it
might have reached a different result or construed the facts differ-
15. Id. at 402.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 381.
18. Id. at 402.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
22. Id. What is clearly erroneous is a matter of interpretation. Generally an ap-
pellate court will reverse only when well persuaded, and even then, it will do so reluc-
tantly. Steven A. Childress, "Clearly Erroneous ".'Judicial Review Over District Courts in the
Eighth Circuit And Beyond, 51 Mo. L. REV. 93, 107 (1986) (citing United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945)).
23. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see also Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 n.19 (1978); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960); McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20
(1954).
24. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985); United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949).
[Vol. 18
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ently.25 The clearly erroneous standard is strictly construed in situa-
tions where an appellate court is reviewing either demeanor
testimony or documentary evidence. 26
The substantial evidence standard27 has offered further construc-
tion of the clearly erroneous standard. 28 This standard is based on
the theory that, if factual findings are supported by substantial evi-
dence, they are not clearly erroneous. Some cases interpret the sub-
stantial evidence standard to be equivalent to the clearly erroneous
standard,29 while others interpret clearly erroneous to be a stricter
standard.30
The de novo3 standard is proper when the question on appeal is
either a question of law or a mixed question of fact and law.3 2 Under
the de novo standard, the judgment of the trial court is suspended
and the reviewing court makes an independent determination of the
issues.3S The case is decided as though it originated in the reviewing
25. Childress, supra note 22, at 109. The appellate court should not substitute its
judgment on disputed issues of fact when there is substantial credible evidence to
support the findings. Id.
26. Prior to 1985, courts followed the rule that, where the evidence was docu-
mentary, the clearly erroneous standard was not to be strictly construed. See Gay Lib
v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 853 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977), (stating that appellate
court is not bound by findings based on documentary evidence), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1080 (1978). In 1985, however, the Supreme Court amended Rule 52(a), providing,
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added).
27. This standard is similar to the lack of evidence and adequate basis standards.
See, e.g., Seaton v. Sills, 403 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying an adequate basis
standard); Chancy v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1966) (applying a
weight of the evidence standard); HouTs ET AL., supra note 9, § 6.05.
28. Substantial evidence is often used when reviewing jury verdicts as it is di-
rectly related to a "reasonable juror" standard. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus. v.
Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that the reasonableness test is an
application of the substantial evidence requirement), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968);
Midcontinent Broadcast Co. v. North Cent. Airlines, Inc., 471 F.2d 357, 358 (8th Cir.
1973) (holding that sufficiency of evidence standard involves appellate court consid-
ering the entire record as presented to the jury).
29. See e.g., Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d 682, 684 (5th Cir.
1969) (implying that lack of substantial evidence equals clear error).
30. See, e.g., Dillon v. M.S. Oriental Inventor, 426 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir.) (imply-
ing clearly erroneous is stricter standard than substantial evidence), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 903 (1970); W.R.B. Corp. v. Geer, 313 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1963) (implying
that clearly erroneous is stricter standard than substantial evidence).
31. "De novo" is a Latin term for "anew, afresh, a second time." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990).
32. There is no controversy that pure questions of law are freely reviewable.
E.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982); United States v. U.S. Gyp-
sum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394 (1948); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 526 (5th
Cir. 1968). However, not all courts agree on whether mixed questions are freely
reviewable.
33. See, e.g., Reck v. Reck, 46 N.E.2d 429, 430 (Ohio 1942). But see Evan Tsen
19921
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court, and the findings and judgments of the lower court are disre-
garded except when they may be helpful in the reasoning.3 4
Abuse of discretion is the standard used when an appellate court is
reviewing discretionary decisions made by a trial court.3 5 An appel-
late court can reverse a trial court's determination if the appellate
court finds the decision "unreasonable, unconscionable or arbitrary
without proper consideration of facts and law pertaining to matters
submitted."3 6 Certain matters, however, are within the discretion of
the trial court because they are largely ad hoc and situation-
specific.37
C. Factors Influencing the Creation of a Standard
1. Labeling the Issues
Appellate courts have no single, precise rule for choosing a stan-
dard with which to review lower court decisions.38 As a starting
point, the threshold question in formulating the correct standard of
review is whether a finding is factual or legal.39 Findings of fact4O are
Lee, Principled Decisionmaking and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed
Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 244 (1991) (discussing how much deference
an appellate court must accord district court findings on mixed questions of law and
fact).
34. See Lee, supra note 33, at 246.
35. Abuse of discretion is synonymous with a failure to exercise sound, reason-
able, and legal discretion. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 10-11 (6th ed. 1990). It does
not imply an intentional wrong, bad faith, or misconduct. Instead, it implies a judg-
ment that is clearly against logic. Id.
The Supreme Court has equated abuse of discretion with the clearly erroneous
standard. "When an appellate court reviews a district court's factual findings, the
abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable: A court of
appeals would be justified in concluding that a district court had abused its discretion
in making a factual finding only if the finding were clearly erroneous." Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2458 (1990).
36. Harvey v. State, 458 P.2d 336, 338 (Okla. 1969).
37. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 10, at 407.
38. Michael E. O'Neill, Note, A Two-Pronged Standard of Appellate Review for Pretrial
Bail Determinations, 99 YALE LJ. 885, 895 (1990).
39. Courts repeatedly struggle with the distinction between fact and law. One
commentator argues that the distinction does not imply the existence of static, polar
opposites. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229,
233 (1985). Rather, the categories function as constructs that permit us to under-
stand, organize, and regulate certain forms of social experience. Id. The categories
also serve as a means of distributing authority among various decisionmakers in the
legal system. Id. at 234. However, the actual distribution of authority between deci-
sionmakers has often been governed by other factors such as the nature of the sub-
stantive issue and the character of the decisionmakers. Id. Thus, difficulty comes
when judges seek to force allocation decisions into the categories of fact and law. Id.
at 235.
40. A factual finding is an inquiry into what happened in a particular case. The
trier of fact must determine who, what, when, and where. Monaghan, supra note 39,
[Vol. 18
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 19
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/19
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SEIZURES
reviewed for clear error.4 1 Conclusions of law42 are subject to an
independent, de novo review.43 Mixed questions of law and fact are
generally freely reviewable, except when controlled by underlying
facts.44 Mixed questions arise when historical facts are established
and the rule of law is undisputed, or the rule of law as applied to the
facts is violated.45 The question to be resolved is whether the rule of
law, as applied to the established facts, is or is not violated.46
The Supreme Court has yet to formulate a rule that clearly distin-
at 235. Fact questions are those for which resolution is "based ultimately on the
application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human
conduct to the totality of the facts of each case." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363
U.S. 278, 289 (1960). Factual findings are not waiting somewhere for the court to
find. Emmet T. Flood, Note, Fact Construction andJudgment in Constitutional Adjudication,
100 YALE LJ. 1795, 1808 (1991). A factual finding is an interpretation as to what the
judge thinks happened. Id. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of a criminal
trial in which judges and juries must interpret witness recollections of past percep-
tions. Id. at 1809.
41. Different kinds of factfinding chores give rise to more or less deferential re-
view according to the relative capacities of district courts and appellate courts, the
need for uniformity, the perceived importance of the dispute, and the nature of the
legal rules involved. Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 50(A): Rationing and Rationalizing
the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 646 (1988).
42. A legal conclusion or declaration of law involves conclusions about gov-
erning legal rules, standards and principles. Monaghan, supra note 39, at 235. These
conclusions involve formulating a proposition that affects the immediate case and all
others that fall within its terms. A question of law is characterized as general and
applicable to numerous factual circumstances. Id.
43. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984).
44. See Childress, supra note 22, at 154. The United States Supreme Court has
held that deferential review of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when the
district court is "better positioned" than the appellate court to decide the issue or
when probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of the legal doc-
trine. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985). The general approach by the court
of appeals is that if the mixed question involves applying law to an undisputed fact,
then the appellate court should show no deference. But if the court must draw a
factual inference from either an undisputed or disputed fact, then this is clearly
within the purview of the trial court and subject to the clearly erroneous standard of
review. David I. Levine & Hillary J. Salans, Exceptions to the Clearly Erroneous Test After
the Recent Amending of Rule 52(a)for the Review of Facts Based Upon Documentary Evidence,
10 AM. J. TRIAL AIvoc. 409, 429 (1987).
45. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982). See also Charles R.
Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate Treatment
Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 58 TUL. L. REV. 403 (1983).
Professor Calleros argues that the appropriate standard of review for mixed ques-
tions depends on who is best suited to decide the issue. Id. at 419-20. De novo
review is appropriate when the historical facts are relatively clear and the law,
although undisputed, is technical, uncertain, or bound up with sensitive matters of
social or political policy. Id. at 425. These issues are appropriate for appellate
courts, which have the responsibility of formulating new legal standards. Id.
46. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19.
19921
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guishes a factual finding from a legal conclusion.47 Case law offers
little guidance beyond specific determinations in individual situa-
tions.48 Therefore, determining the correct standard of review de-
pends upon more than deciding the oversimplified question of
whether the issue is fact or law.49
2. Traditional Functions of the Trial and Appellate Courts
An appropriate standard of review must take into account the insti-
tutional functions of the courts. Thus, formulating the correct stan-
dard of review in close cases often turns on which judicial actor is
best suited to decide the issue.50 Issues that are mostly factual are
best decided by the trial court. The trial court has the advantage of
hearing the evidence and observing the demeanor of witnesses.5t
Certainty as to what actually happened is impossible, but the trial
judge or jury is in the best position to make credibility choices and
resolve conflicting testimony.52
Appellate courts, on the other hand, are chiefly law courts. Their
main responsibilities include correcting errors in individual cases
and developing the law in ways that guide future conduct and future
litigants.53 Appellate courts are well suited to develop and declare
legal principles that will apply beyond the case at bar and serve as
precedent in future cases. 54 The appellate court is superior to the
trial court in researching, interpreting, and applying the law. This
superiority is due to its specialization in deciding legal questions, its
customarily greater library and law clerk resources, and its habit of
collegial decision making.55 A three-judge appellate panel is in a
better position to make legal determinations because it benefits from
the give and take of judicial negotiation56 and is not encumbered by
47. See id. at 288.
48. Childress, supra note 22, at 133.
49. Factors which can influence an appellate court's choice of a standard of re-
view are explicit congressional authorization, established policy, and precedent. See
generally id. at 895-901.
50. While Congress has not spoken, the "distinction at times has turned on a
determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial
actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question." Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.
Ct. 2447 (1990) (stating that district court is better situated than the court of appeals
to decide issue in question); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
51. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 10, at 402.
52. O'Neill, supra note 38, at 902.
53. Cooper, supra note 41, at 649.
54. O'Neill, supra note 38, at 901.
55. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 10, at 402.
56. The courts of appeals "are structurally suited to the collaborative judicial
process that promotes decisional accuracy." Salve Regina College v. Russell, Ill S.
[Vol. 18
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the time-consuming process of evidentiary hearings.5 7 Appellate
courts provide a corrective function to guarantee that lower courts
have done justice in a particular case. 58 Finally, they play a supervi-
sory role which ensures that proper and consistent procedures have
been followed throughout the circuit.59
3. Constitutional Factfinding
Some courts find that appellate review of factual findings involving
constitutional issues is "perhaps different" than appellate review of
ordinary factual findings.60 These courts deem the factual findings
to be of special importance, given the constitutional issues involved,
and therefore engage in independent review.61
The Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional fact doctrine
has been inconsistent. The Court has been willing to accept a more
active appellate role for review of state court decisions involving con-
stitutional rights.62 When addressing issues starting in the federal
Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991); Three-judge panels "permit reflective dialogue and collective
judgment." Id. Furthermore,
Without adequate study there cannot be adequate reflection; without ade-
quate reflection there cannot be adequate discussion; without adequate dis-
cussion there cannot be that fruitful interchange of minds which is
indispensable to thoughtful, unhurried decision and its formulation in
learned and impressive opinions.
Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co. 359 U.S. 437, 458-459 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
57. O'Neill, supra note 38, at 901. With the record settled below, the appellate
judges are able to devote their attention to legal issues. Salve Regina College, 11 S.
Ct. at 1221.
58. O'Neill, supra note 38, at 901.
59. Id.
60. See e.g., Miller v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 720 F.2d 356, 361 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983)
(considering whether review process is "perhaps different"), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1083 (1985). Constitutional facts have been characterized as a special category of
factual questions that, because of their importance, must be independently reviewed
by appellate courts, or as mixed questions of law and fact, because they involve the
application of legal principles to facts. Louis S. Raveson, A New Perspective on the Judi-
cial Contempt Power: Recommendations for Reform, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 1 (1990).
61. Courts which apply the constitutional fact doctrine emphasize a judicial con-
cern that federal rights not be improperly denied. Monaghan, supra note 39, at 245.
"But if labeling something a question of constitutional fact guarantees that it will be
treated like a question of law, then either party is entitled to independent appellate
review." Id. For the history of the doctrine of constitutional factfinding, see id. at
248-53.
62. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). InJacobellis, the Court re-
versed a state court conviction for possession and exhibition of an obscene film. Id.
Justices Brennan and Goldberg emphasized that independent review was necessary
to keep factfinders from creating widely divergent local definitions of obscenity,
thereby undermining the meaning of the First Amendment. Id. at 193. Justices War-
ren and Black warned that the Court was stepping beyond its proper role as an appel-
late court. Id. at 196 (BlackJ, concurring in the judgment); id. at 203 (Warren, C.J.,
19921
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district court, however, it does not appear that the Court has broad-
ened review of factual issues merely because an appeal might raise
constitutional issues. 63
Ultimate facts, like constitutional facts, have also received special
consideration by the courts.64 In Pullman-Standard v. Swint,65 the
Court rejected the ultimate fact doctrine, holding that the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals erred when it conducted de novo review of a
factual issue.66 The Court rejected the theory that facts are divided
into subsidiary and ultimate facts.67 The appellate court had made
an independent determination as to whether, under "the totality of
the facts and circumstances," there was a discriminatory purpose.68
The Supreme Court maintained that resolution of the issue required
determining the defendants' intent. 69 The Court held that such a
determination "is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule 52(a)'s
clearly-erroneous standard." 70
However, the Court has carved out an exception to the clearly er-
roneous standard of review in First Amendment libel cases. In Bose
dissenting). For other cases in which the Court has conducted de novo review of
state court factual findings, see Salve Regina College v. Russell, Il1 S. Ct. 1217
(1991); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767
(1967); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); see also Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or
Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law,
73 MINN. L. REV. 899 (1989).
63. See infra note 76.
64. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1984) (stating that
finding ultimate facts implicates application of standards of law); Causey v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 516 F.2d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that appellate court is free to make
an independent determination of factual issue that is the ultimate issue for resolu-
tion); Industrial Instrument Corp. v. Foxbord Co., 307 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1962)
(holding that court of appeals can reverse ultimate fact questions free for clearly er-
roneous rule), rehk'g denied, 310 F.2d 686 (1962); Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592,
593 (3d Cir. 1953) (stating that ultimate fact is free from clearly erroneous rule).
65. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
66. Id. at 287-90.
.67. Id. at 287. "The Fifth Circuit's rule on appellate consideration of 'ultimate
facts' has its roots" in Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 665. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 286
n.16. In Baumgartner, the Court discussed ultimate facts and conducted a de novo
review. Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 671. However, Baumgartner does not stand for the
proposition that whenever a result in a case turns on a factual finding, an appellate
court is not bound by Rule 52(a). Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 286 n. 16. Baumgart-
ner's discussion of ultimate facts did not refer to pure findings of fact but to findings
that clearly imply the application of standards of law. Id. at 287.
68. Id. at 283-84. The appellate court recognized that the issue of discriminatory
intent was "essentially a question of fact." Id. at 285. It determined, however, that,
since the question was "the ultimate issue for resolution," it must conduct a de novo
review, even though it was bound by the district court's determination of the subsidi-
ary facts, which were not clearly erroneous. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 289.
70. Id. at 287-88.
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Corporation v. Consumers Union of America,7 ' the Court allowed an in-
dependent review of the determination of actual malice in First
Amendment defamation cases despite the pure factual nature of a
libel defendant's intent, knowledge, or state of mind.72 This, how-
ever, is only one narrow exception.73 Bose did not indicate that it was
redefining Rule 52. 74 It is unlikely that the Court meant to under-
mine Swint's adherence to Rule 52 or to broaden review merely be-
cause an appeal might raise constitutional interests.75 The Court has
yet to invoke Bose in this broad way. 76
71. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
72. Id. at 507-509; see also Childress, supra note 22, at 150.
73. It is important to note that Bose has been narrowly construed to apply only to
lower court findings of actual malice, but it has been rejected in other areas of First
Amendment law. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that au-
thority to determine obscenity under the First Amendment should be left with the
trial court).
74. Childress, supra note 22, at 151-52.
75. Id. at 152.
76. Id. The Court has neither required nor authorized de novo review of all fac-
tual findings involving other constitutional issues. See Hernandez v. New York, 111
S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (refusing to overturn findings on issue of discriminatory intent
unless clearly erroneous); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (deferring to the
district court's determination of factual issues unless it has no support in the record);
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (applying clearly errone-
ous for review of decisions interpreting state's power of taxation under the Com-
merce Clause); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (applying substantial basis for
Fourth Amendment probable cause determinations); Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982) (holding that factual findings are not clearly erroneous in the area of voting);
Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S, at 286 (reviewing factual findings concerning intent to dis-
criminate for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979)
(applying clearly erroneous standard for appellate review of segregation issues under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Miller, 413 U.S. at 15
(leaving authority to determine obscenity with the trial court); United States v.
Phelps, 955 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing denial of release for clear error);
United States v. McNeal, 955 F.2d 1067 (6th Cir. 1992) (reviewing factual findings
underlying Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy issue); United States v. Cama-
cho, 955 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1992) (reviewing factual findings regarding right to con-
front accusers at trial for clear error); United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.
1992) (reviewing factual findings regarding concern regarding photographic lineup
for clear error); United States v. Kane, 955 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1992) (reviewing dis-
trict court decision concerning criminal defendant's ability to pay for counsel for
clear error); United States v. Preciado-Robles, 954 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that whether district court correctly found that defendant's consent was voluntary is
subject to the clearly erroneous standard); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496
(8th Cir. 1992) (reviewing factual findings concerning whether a defendant waived
his rights under the clearly erroneous standard); Jordon v. Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137
(9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing factual findings in Fourth Amendment pat search issue for
clear error); United States v. 62.50 Acres of Land More or Less, 953 F.2d 886 (5th
Cir. 1992) (holding whether landowner has carried burden of establishing value of
land sought to be condemned will be reversed only when it is clearly erroneous);
Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1992) (reviewing factual findings in habeas
1992]
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D. The Fourth Amendment Seizure Test
Courts have struggled to formulate the correct standard of review
for Fourth Amendment seizures. The Fourth Amendment protects
people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the govern-
ment. 7 7 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate
all contact between the police and citizenry, but to prevent arbitrary
and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with individu-
als' privacy and personal security. 78
The point at which a person is seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment is not always clear. 79 Prior to 1980, the courts
found that a seizure had occurred "[o]nly when the officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen."80 In United States v. Mendenhall,81 the Supreme
Court redefined the seizure test.8 2 The Court stated, "We conclude
that a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the fourth
proceedings under clearly erroneous standard); United States v. Ross, 953 F.2d 641
(4th Cir. 1992) (reviewing voluntariness of consent to search for clear error);Jackson
v. Whitener, 953 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1992) (reviewing factual findings regarding exist-
ence of Jencks Act material for clear error); United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding district court's findings that there was no harassment by
police not clearly erroneous); United States v. Caba, 955 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1992)
(reviewing validity of Miranda waiver for clear error); Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796
(7th Cir. 1991) (reviewing factual findings in civil rights action for clear error).
77. This amendment guarantees people the "right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," and pro-
vides, "no warrants shall be issued but upon probable cause" and then only as to a
specific place to be searched. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
78. 1 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.8(d), at 205 (2d ed. 1987).
79. Voluntary cooperation of a citizen through non-coercive questioning is
outside the realm of Fourth Amendment protection. There is no violation of the
Fourth Amendment when a police officer approaches an individual and asks him to
answer some questions. The person approached, however, need not answer any
question put to him. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1982). As long as the
person reasonably feels he is at liberty to ignore the police and go about his business,
there is no restraint on one's liberty and therefore the encounter is outside the realm
of Fourth Amendment protection. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1982).
However, if a person is made to feel that she must stay and answer the question put
to her, the person has been "seized". If the officer did not have lawful authority to
seize the person, the seizure is considered unreasonable and therefore a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Any evidence obtained from an unreasonable seizure can-
not be used in a criminal prosecution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1975).
80. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). The Court acknowledged that,
under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure may occur without taking a suspect to the
police station. Id. at 16.
81. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
82. In Mendenhal, the Supreme Court was divided. Justices Stewart and Rehn-
quist found that no seizure had occurred and, thus, no Fourth Amendment protec-
tions were triggered. They stated that a seizure occurs only when, in view of all the
surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed she was not
free to leave. Id. at 554. They felt that there was nothing to suggest to Mendenhall
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amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave." 83
The Court adopted a reasonable person standard rather than at-
tempting to determine a defendant's subjective state of mind. This
test has been reaffirmed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions and
is uniformly applied by the circuit courts. 84
that she was not free to reject the agent's questions and proceed on her way. Id. at
555.
Justices Powell, Burger, and Blackmun ruled that a seizure had occurred and
found that it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). They suggested that they would have approved of a reasonable person stan-
dard had the question been properly raised. Id. at 560 n.1.
Justice White's dissent,joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens agreed
that the seizure issue was improperly raised but stated that if a seizure was to be
assumed, it clearly was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 570 (White, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also criticized the majority's conclusion on the grounds that
they could not agree on whether Mendenhall was seized. Id. at 566.
83. Id at 554. As long as the person reasonably feels that he is free to ignore the
police and go about his business, there is no restraint on his liberty and, therefore,
the encounter is outside the realm of Fourth Amendment protections. See Michigan
v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983).
84. See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 567; INS
v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Royer, 460 U.S. at 491.
In Royer, the Court, applying the totality of the circumstances test, reached a
different result on facts nearly identical to those in Mendenhall. Royer, 460 U.S. at 491.
Even though there was only one significant factual difference, the Court found this
enough to conclude that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave. Id. at 502.
In Chesternut, the Court reaffirmed and restated the Mendenhall test. Chesternut,
486 U.S. at 574. The Court refused to find that a seizure occurs whenever police are
involved in a chase. Instead, the Court found that the crucial test was whether, taking
into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct
would "have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ig-
nore the police presence and go about his business." Id. at 569. The Court also
emphasized that the reasonable person standard ensures that the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individ-
ual being approached. Id. at 574.
In Delgado, the Court addressed the fine line between voluntary interaction and
seizure:
What is apparent ... is that police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result
in a Fourth Amendment violation. While most citizens will respond to a
police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they
are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the re-
sponse. Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to
demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free
to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning re-
sulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. But if the person re-
fuses to answer and the police take additional steps to obtain an answer then
the Fourth Amendment imposes some minimal level of objective justifica-
tion to validate the detention or seizure.
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17 (citations omitted).
In Bostick, the Court answered a certified question to determine whether police,
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E. Circuit Courts and Developing Standards of Review
Although the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reaf-
firmed the Mendenhall seizure test, it has not provided a standard for
appellate review of seizure determinations. Nor has the Court
agreed on which standard is correct. 85 Consequently, a sharp divi-
sion among the circuits has arisen. Of the twelve circuits, six circuits
apply de novo, while five apply clearly erroneous. The Third Circuit
has yet to take a stand on the issue.
1. Circuits Using the Clearly Erroneous Standard
The First,8 6 Fourth, 87 Fifth,88 Sixth,89 Seventh90 and Eleventh9 l
without articulable suspicion, could board a bus and ask at random for, and receive,
consent to search passengers' luggage. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382. The Court held that
random bus searches conducted pursuant to passengers' consent are not per se un-
constitutional. Id. The Court adhered to the Chesternut rule and found that, in deter-
mining "whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider
all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not
free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Id. at
2389.
85. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
86. See United States v. Karas, 950 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. West,
651 F.2d 71, 73-74 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that district court's conclusion that no
seizure occurred was not clearly erroneous).
87. See United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that deter-
mination whether a seizure had occurred was subject to reversal only if clearly erro-
neous); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
131 (1990); United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1982).
88. United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that ultimate
question of legality of search and seizure is question of law and thus subject to de
novo review); United States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding that determination that a seizure has or has not occurred is a finding
of fact subject to reversal only for clear error); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d
1036, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating seizure determination is not easy and calls for
a refined judgment by the trial court), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980).
89. See United States v. Wakefield, 943 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1495 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that district court's seizure deter-
mination not clearly erroneous); United States v. Fulton, 830 F.2d 194 (6th Cir.
1987); United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1061 (1985); United States v. Collis, 699 F.2d 832, 835 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1119 (1983).
90. See United States v. Williams, 945 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that re-
viewing court will not overturn denial of motion to suppress unless decision was
clearly erroneous); United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 1518, 1522 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Berke, 930 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that whether a
particular encounter is voluntary is a factual question; therefore, the "standard of
review is a limited inquiry into whether the decision of the district court was clearly
erroneous"); United States v. Edwards, 898 F.2d 1273, 1276 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Dunigan, 884 F.2d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Teslim, 869
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Circuits currently apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to
seizure determinations. These courts have advanced several reasons
for using the clearly erroneous standard. First, these courts are con-
vinced that the factual nature of the Mendenhall test requires a clearly
erroneous standard of review. 92 Second, these courts stress that the
district court judge is in the best position to make the decision.
9 3
The determination that a seizure has occurred is a close call that re-
quires a refined judgment.9 4 The district court hears all the evidence
and testimony and, thus, is in the best position to assess witness
credibility and to evaluate whether, under the totality of the circum-
stances, the defendant has been seized.95 Third, these courts argue
that de novo review improperly transforms a factual determination-
whether the defendant was seized-into a legal issue. Simply be-
cause resolution of a factual issue is dispositive does not mean it
should lose its factual nature.
96
2. Circuits Using the De Novo Standard
The Second,9 7 Eighth,98 Ninth,99 TenthOO and District of Colum-
F.2d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the determination of a seizure is highly
factual and requires clearly erroneous standard); United States v. Espinosa-Alvarez,
839 F.2d 1201, 1205 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Eighty-Four Thousand Dollars
U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d
129, 138-139 (7th Cir. 1982).
91. See United States v. Hammock, 860 F.2d 390, 393 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding
that district court did not clearly err when it found that a reasonable person would
have felt free to leave the bus).
92. See United States v. Berke, 930 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d
316, 321 (7th Cir. 1989).
93. See Edwards, 898 F.2d at 1276; United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 418
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 214 (1990); Espinosa-Alvarez, 839 F.2d at 1205;
Eighty-Four Thousand Dollars U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d at 1095.
94. See United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980).
95. See United States v. Karas, 950 F.2d 31, 35 (1991) (stating that the district
court's findings were "fact specific and based on credibility determinations .... Be-
cause they were neither clearly erroneous nor amounted to an abuse of discretion, we
are not free to overrule them .... ); Maragh, 894 F.2d at 420.(Mikva, J., dissenting)
(stating that the court of appeals should not disregard the trial judge's premier role
in difficult evaluation of the constitutional claims), United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d
316, 321 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that standard of review is limited and requires that
deference be given to the district judge who had the opportunity to observe the testi-
mony and demeanor of the witnesses); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 134 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983).
96. See Teslim, 869 F.2d at 316.
97. See United States v. Springer, 946 F.2d 1012, 1015 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Madison, 936
F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 489 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that find-
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bialol Circuits apply the de novo standard when reviewing a seizure
determination. The courts which have addressed the issue have fo-
cused on the language of previous Supreme Court decisions and are
persuaded that the Court has adopted the de novo standard. 102 The
District of Columbia Circuit has even stated that de novo review is a
firmly entrenched standard required by the Supreme Court.103
These courts also found that the objectivity of the reasonable per-
son standard requires uniform application of Fourth Amendment
protection. The courts assert that de novo review helps to ensure
consistent application.104 A related reason given by the courts ap-
plying de novo review is that appellate judges have a constitutional
responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact.105
ings as to what various parties said or did was subject to clearly erroneous standard,
but the question of whether those statements and acts resulted in seizure is one of
law subject to de novo review).
98. See United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 593 (1991).
99. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
question of whether a defendant has standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim
should be reviewed de novo); United States v. Mines, 883 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 552 (1990); United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1591,
1522 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1987). But see United States
v. Erwin, 803 F.2d 1505, 1508 (9th Cir. 1986) (reviewing seizure determination for
clear error); United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
determination of whether such contact constitutes a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment turns largely on factual issues; proper deference should be
given to the trial court judge and therefore should not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous).
100. See United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that de-
fendant's seizure is a question of law to be reviewed by the appellate court de novo);
United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1565-66 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1513-14 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that ultimate determinations
of reasonableness concerning Fourth Amendment issues and other questions of law
are reviewed de novo); United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. United States v. Jordan, 951 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the
district court's conclusion that seizure of defendant in bus depot was subject to de
novo review); United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir.) (reviewing
seizure determination de novo), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 214 (1990).
102. See United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1991); Maragh, 894
F.2d at 417-18.
103. Maragh, 894 F.2d at 417. In Maragh, the court stated that the District Court's
seizure determination was reviewable de novo, and that such review was 'irmly en-
trenched doctrine in this court" and required by the Supreme Court. Id. (emphasis
added).
104. Id.; See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988); United States v.
McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1425 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Gibson,J., concurring).
105. Maragh, 894 F.2d at 418.
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3. Standard Used by the Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit has not consistently applied one standard when
reviewing seizure determinations. Several Eighth Circuit decisions
apply the clearly erroneous standardo 6 while others apply the de
novo standard. 0 7 Yet others review seizure determinations without
using any standard.108
III. UNITED STATES V. MCKINES
Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to
clarify the issue. In United States v. McKines, the court held that factual
findings of the district court are to be reviewed for clear error, but
the ultimate seizure determination is a "legal characterization" that
must be reviewed de novo.' 0 9
A. Background
United States v. McKines began when an official from the Drug En-
forcement Administration observed James A. McKines in an airport
and suspected he was a drug courier.t10 The agents obtained con-
106. See United States v. Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Archer, 840 F.2d 567, 571 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941 (1988); United
States v. Hendrix, 726 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1984).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Condelee, 915 F.2d 1206, 1209 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Hernandez, 854 F.2d 295, 297 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1988).
Campbell held that the ultimate conclusion of the seizure's constitutionality was
reviewable de novo. Id. Judge Beam's opinion in McKines pointed out that a careful
reading of Campbell reveals that it does not directly support de novo review. United
States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1420 n.7 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (Beam, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 593 (1991). Whether the Fourth Amendment has been
violated is not the same question as whether a seizure occurred. Id. If there is a
seizure, the ultimate conclusion that the Fourth Amendment has been violated de-
pends on whether the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion. Id.
108. In United States v. Dennis, 933 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1991), the court con-
cluded that an encounter did not result in a seizure. "After reviewing the totality of
the circumstances, we conclude that the encounter between Dennis and the officers
did not result in his seizure. We also conclude that the district court's finding that
Dennis voluntarily consented to the search of his person was not clearly erroneous."
Id. In reaching its conclusion that no seizure occurred, there is no reference to any
standard. The court does use clearly erroneous for the consent issue, but this is a
separate issue and this standard is not controversial. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (stating that the voluntariness of a person's consent to a
search is a question of fact to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard).
109. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1426 (Gibson, J., concurring specially).
110. Id. at 1414 (Beam, J.). Agent Hicks from the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, accompanied by two detectives from the Platte County Sheriff's Office observed
the defendant, James A. McKines, deplane in Kansas City. McKines was casually
dressed in black trousers, a white pullover shirt and loafers or sandals without socks.
He was bearded and wore sunglasses. McKines walked directly to a telephone, made
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sent, I 11 searched his two suitcases, found PCP concealed in a Moun-
tain Dew bottle, and arrested McKines. t t2 Prior to trial, McKines
a call and then proceeded to the baggage claim area, where he was observed "glanc-
ing about." He claimed two suitcases and left the terminal building in search of a
cab. Based on these observations, Hicks suspected McKines was a drug courier. Id.
Hicks' suspicions were due to the fact that McKines exhibited characteristics con-
sistent with the drug courier profile. The drug courier profile consists of a list of
characteristics which the DEA believes are typical of drug couriers in a given trans-
portational and geographical setting. See Mark G. Ledwin, The Use of the Drug Courier
Profile in Traffic Stops: Valid Police Practice or Fourth Amendment Violation?, 15 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 593 (1988). The most prominent application of the profile is by the DEA as a
tool to combat drug traffic on domestic airlines. Joseph P. D'Ambrosio, Note, The
Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable Intrusions or Suspicionless Seizures?, 12
NOVA L. REV. 273, 275 (1987).
There has been a substantial amount of litigation regarding the constitutionality
of the profile. Id. The profile has been widely criticized as a means which invites
police violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier
Profile: "All Seems Infected That Th' Infected Spy, As All Look Yellow to theJaundic'd Eye," 65
N.C. L. REV. 417 (1987) (analyzing inconsistencies and empirical inadequacies that
adhere to the DEA's profile); Ledwin, supra, at 593 (stating that use of profile raises
obvious and significant Fourth Amendment concerns); Steven K. Bernstein, Note,
Fourth Amendment-Using the Drug Courier Profile to Fight the War on Drugs, 80 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 996 (1990) (addressing the hazards of relying on profile that has no
predictive value); D'Ambrosio, supra, at 273 (concluding that when used in connec-
tion with the drug courier profile, the Mendenhall seizure standard invites arbitrary
police conduct); Alec Farmer, Note, Criminal Procedure-'"Drug Courier" Characteristics
are Sufficient to Establish Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Conduct, 12 U. ARK. LrrrE RocK
L.J. 407 (1990) (stating that the Court's acceptance of the "drug courier" profile
causes practical problems).
Airport drug search cases can involve up to six separate issues. Does the initial
stop of the suspect constitute a seizure? Does the drug courier profile provide a
constitutionally permissible basis to make an investigative stop? When do DEA
agents have reasonable suspicion to stop the airline traveler in the first place? When,
after the initial encounter, does reasonable suspicion arise? When does a traveler
voluntarily consent to an interview or to relocate to a private office? If the traveler is
seized illegally, but then voluntarily consents to a search, must the court exclude the
seized contraband from evidence at trial? See Farmer, supra, at 413-19.
111. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1414 (Beam, J.). Outside the terminal, Hicks ap-
proached McKines and identified himself as a police officer. Hicks asked if he could
talk to McKines. McKines agreed. At Hicks' request, McKines gave Hicks his air-
plane ticket, issued to John McKines, and his driver's license issued in the name of
James McKines. McKines shrugged off this discrepancy. Hicks returned the driver's
license and identified himself as a DEA agent and told McKines that he was watching
for drugs being smuggled into Kansas City. Id. at 1414. He also asked McKines if he
had any drugs concealed in his suitcases. McKines denied possessing drugs. The
district court found that McKines volunarily consented for Hicks to search his suit-
case. Id. at 1423. The court of appeals held this finding was not clearly erroneous. Id.
112. Id. In the larger suitcase, Hicks thought he smelled PCP and examined an
eight-pack of sixteen-ounce Mountain Dew bottles. Since the bottle caps appeared
not to have been removed, Hicks concluded the interview, and McKines left to get a
cab. Detective Kessler, one of the detectives accompanying Hicks, said he was certain
that the bottles did not contain Mountain Dew, as Mountain Dew is opaque, while the
liquid in the bottles appeared to be clear. Kessler also mentioned that it was possible
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moved to suppress the evidence seized from the suitcase."t3 The
district court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the en-
counter between the DEA agent and McKines did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, and that McKines voluntarily consented to the
search." 4 Following a jury trial, McKines was convicted on three
counts of possession of PCP.115
McKines appealed the conviction, arguing that the encounter with
the DEA agent was not supported by reasonable suspicion.11 6 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that
a seizure did not occur and that McKines voluntary consented to the
search of his suitcase. 1
The majority and concurrence both applied a clearly erroneous
standard of review.l18 However, the court failed to distinguish the
separate issues of seizure and consent. After blurring the two tests,
the court stated that the question of consent is factual and requires
clearly erroneous review."t 9 Next, the court concluded that McKines
was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thus
never specifically stating a standard of review for the seizure issue.
This opinion was vacated and the court, sitting en banc, reheard the
issue.12 0
to reseal a bottle to make it look as if it had never been opened. With that informa-
tion, Hicks again approached McKines outside the terminal, obtained consent, took a
bottle, unsealed it, and immediately detected a strong odor of PCP. McKines was
then arrested. Id. at 1414 n.l.
113. Id. at 1415.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1412. McKines was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute PCP, possession with intent to distribute PCP, and traveling in interstate
commerce with intent to possess PCP. Id
116. Id. at 1415.
117. United States v. McKines, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990) vacated and reh'g
granted (8th Cir. Dec. 28, 1990). The court also held that imposition of mandatory
life sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment for Eighth Amendment pur-
poses. Id.
118. Id. at 1080, 1083.
119. When addressing the seizure issue, the court applied the Mendenhall test. Id.
at 1080. The court then stated that consent, not seizure, is a question of fact and
therefore is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. The court then ad-
dressed the seizure issue and concluded there was no seizure. Id.
120. In the original court of appeals decision, Judge Beam noted the difficulty
that airport-stop drug cases involve. Id. at 1083. His concern was that the issues
should be clarified by the whole court.
These airport-stop drug cases involve difficult factual questions with which
district courts often struggle in suppression hearings. Their conclusions
should not be overturned as clearly erroneous on the basis of a few factors,
drawn not from Supreme Court jurisprudence but from a few circuit cases,
and reduced to a sentence or a paragraph, which masquerade as a rule that
will provide unarguable answers .... [Ilt is time for this circuit to reconsider
this issue en banc.
Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)).
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B. Rehearing En Banc
1. The Conviction
At the rehearing, the court again affirmed McKines' conviction. 121
In reaching its decision, however, the court was sharply divided.
There are four separate opinions and two different majorities, one
deciding whether to affirm McKines' conviction and the other decid-
ing the standard of review for seizure determinations.122 By a six to
four margin, the court held that McKines was not seized, his consent
was voluntary, and thus, his conviction on all three counts was
affirmed. 123
Judge Magill dissented, arguing that the encounter between Agent
Hicks and McKines constituted an illegal seizure of McKines. 124 He
argued that the PCP should be suppressed because it was obtained in
a manner inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. 12 5
Judge Lay also dissented, agreeing with Judge Magill that McK-
ines' conviction should be reversed.126 However, the Judge wrote
separately, criticizing the majority for stating that previous Eighth
Circuit decisions should be overruled.12 7 Judge Lay also argued that
121. United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 593 (1991). The court was divided as to the proper standard for reviewing
McKines' conviction. Judges Beam, Bowman, and Wollman affirmed the conviction
based on a clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. at 1422-24. Judges Gibson,
Fagg, and Loken concurred specially, affirming the conviction based on a de novo
standard of review. Id. at 1424-26 (Gibson, J., concurring specially).
122. The court was divided on whether to affirm the conviction and which stan-
dard of review to apply. The opinion, written by Judge Beam and joined by Judges
Bowman and Wollman, consisted of a majority vote to affirm McKines' conviction but
included an argument in favor of a clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. at 1412-
22 (Beam, J.). The opinion of the court on the issue of the standard of review was a
special concurrence written by Judge Gibson and joined by Judges Fagg and Loken
that consisted of a majority vote to affirm McKines' conviction, but held that de novo
is the standard of review. Id. at 1424-26 (Gibson, J., concurring specially). A third
opinion was a dissent written by Judge Magill and joined by Chief Judge Lay and
Judges McMillian and Arnold, which voted to reverse McKines' conviction but agreed
with Gibson's opinion that de novo is the correct standard of review, thus making de
novo the standard. Id. at 1427-30 (McGill, J., dissenting). A fourth opinion was an-
other dissent written by Chief Judge Lay and joined by Judge McMillian which also
voted to reverse the conviction. Id. at 1430-33 (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
123. Judges Gibson, Fagg, Bowman, Wollman, Beam and Loken voted to affirm
McKines' conviction. Id. at 1424 (Beam, J.); Id. at 1426 (Gibson, J., concurring spe-
cially). ChiefJudge Lay and Judges McMillian and Arnold voted to reverse McKines'
conviction. Id. at 1430 (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1427 (Magill, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1430. Judge Magill argued that when McKines was illegally seized, his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The violation tainted McKines' subsequent
consent to the search of his luggage and therefore the liquid PCP should have been
suppressed and McKines' conviction reversed. Id.
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a policy to control illegal drug use is not a sufficient reason for violat-
ing a person's Fourth Amendment rights.128
2. Standard of Review
a. Majority: De Novo 129
(1) Judge Gibson's Special Concurrence
By a seven to three margin, McKines held that de novo was
the appropriate standard of appellate review for Fourth
Amendment seizure.130 First, McKines reasoned that the
Supreme Court's approach and analysis demonstrate that it
has applied the de novo standard.131 The majority also found
compelling the reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit,
I am bothered by the statement in Judge Beam's opinion that portions of
several well reasoned cases of this court should no longer be followed. Each
of these cases turned on its facts and well-reasoned legal evaluations by dif-
ferent panels of the court, adhering to the contextual approach mandated by
the Supreme Court. In my judgment, none of these cases were decided er-
roneously and each should continue as viable precedent in this circuit.
Id.
128. Id. at 1433. "Random invasions of an individual's privacy cannot be justified
by the necessity of extinguishing illegal drug use." Id.
129. Three of the votes favoring de novo review were from the special
concurrence written by Judge Gibson which was joined by Judges Fagg and Loken.
See id. at 1424-26 (Gibson, J., concurring specially). The other four votes in favor of
de novo were from the dissent written by Judge Magill and joined by Chief Judge
Lay, and Judges McMillian and Arnold, which joined in Part I of Judge Gibson's
special concurrence adopting a de novo standard of review. See id. at 1427 (Magill, J.,
dissenting). Chief Judge Lay wrote a separate dissent, which was joined by Judge
McMillian, offering further analysis for adopting a de novo standard. See id. at 1431
(Lay, CJ., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1412 (Beam, J.). McKines adopted the approach used by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Montilla which held that factual findings as to what the vari-
ous parties to the encounter said or did are reviewed for clear error, but whether
those acts resulted in a seizure is a question of law subject to de novo review. 928
F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1991). The McKines court stated, "We believe the reasoning in
Maragh and Montilla is compelling and it accords with our reading of Mendenhall,
Royer, Chesternut, and Hodari D." McKines, 933 F.2d at 1426 (Gibson, J., concurring
specially).
131. Id. at 1425 (Gibson, J., concurring specially). The court referred to Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Mendenhall, where he concluded, "the correctness of the
legal characterization of the facts appearing in the record is a matter for this court to
determine" and that "as a matter of law," certain conduct does not amount to a
seizure. Id. at 1424-25 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555
(1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted)). The court pointed to other
cases to demonstrate that the Supreme Court approached the seizure issue as a ques-
tion of law. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 491 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491 (1983). In response to these cases, the Eighth Circuit stated, "there is no
indication in these cases that the Court ... granted any deference to the lower courts'
determinations .... [Ilt is also significant that the Supreme Court... used the words
'conclude' or 'conclusion' which indicates a determination of a legal issue rather than
19921
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which held that Mendenhall set forth an objective legal test
which was to be consistently applied from one police encoun-
ter to the next. 32 Finally, the court held that the question of a
seizure is a legal characterization that must be reviewed de
novo.133
(2) Judge Lay 's Concurrence
Although he voted to reverse McKines' conviction, Judge
Lay agreed that the correct standard of review for seizure de-
terminations is de novo. 3 4 He criticized the court, however,
for its esoteric discussion of the correct standard's5 stating,
"the ultimate question of whether the facts constitute an arrest
or seizure under the Constitution always has been and always
will be a question of law for a reviewing court."136
b. Judge Beam's Dissent: Clearly Erroneous
Judge Beam maintained that the correct standard of review is
clearly erroneous.' 3 7 He disagreed with the majority's finding that
the vague references made by the Supreme Court demonstrate that it
had decided that de novo was the appropriate standard.138 Instead,
the fact-intensive nature of the seizure test is the only consistent,
dominant theme in each of the Supreme Court cases. 139 Judge Beam
correctly noted that approaches used by other circuits, including past
a review of a factual issue." McKines, 933 F.2d at 1425 (Gibson, J., concurring spe-
cially) (citations omitted).
132. United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417-18 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 214 (1990). The McKines court never explicitly stated that de novo review ensures
consistent application, but it discussed and adopted the reasoning in Maragh, which
held that de novo review helps to ensure consistent application. See McKines, 933 F.2d
at 1425-26 (Gibson, J., concurring specially).
133. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1426 (Gibson, J., concurring specially).
134. Id. at 1431 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1431 n.2 (stating that the court should not "engage in obfuscating de-
bate about what standard of review governs these cases.").
136. Id. at 1431. "Justice Stewart was not espousing new constitutional doctrine
when he observed 'the correctness of the legal characterization of the facts appearing
in the record is a matter for this court to determine.' This is simply a passing legal
truism which has been taught to first year law students ever since law schools began."
Id. (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 1422 (Beam, J., dissenting).
138. Id. Judge Beam argued that nothing in the Supreme Court cases indicated
that a majority of the justices had concluded that the seizure issue was a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact necessarily subject to de novo review. Id. Any attempt to con-
clude what standard of review the Supreme Court must have silently applied is
fraught with danger. Although other circuits have found this sort of analysis persua-
sive, it is little more than speculation. Id. at 1419-20. See infra note 147.
139. Id. at 1420.
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Eighth Circuit decisions, are inconsistent.140 Judge Beam then con-
cluded that the district court's determination was essentially one of
fact and that the district court was better able to make the seizure
determination.' 4 '
Judge Beam also rejected the idea that the objectivity of the Men-
denhall test transforms the inquiry into a legal one. Instead, the ob-
jectivity of the Mendenhall test is similar to a finding of negligence
which is subject to clearly erroneous review.142
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Problem
Despite clear opportunity, the Supreme Court has not decided the
proper standard of review for a seizure determination.143 Courts
facing the issue, appropriately, are concerned with the need to pre-
serve the precious liberties established by the Constitution. Appel-
late courts are reluctant to extend too much deference to a district
court's findings for fear that justice will not be done. However, ap-
pellate courts also wish to avoid an unending review of factual pat-
terns too peculiar to recur.' 44
As the issue currently stands, individuals receive varying degrees
of constitutional protection depending upon where they live. De-
fendants who live in the Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth or District of
Columbia Circuits are likely to appeal because an appellate judge
140. Id. For a discussion of Eighth Circuit decisions, see supra notes 106-108 and
accompanying text.
141. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1421-22 (BeamJ., dissenting) (the seizure inquiry "ad-
dresses a fact-bound question with a totality-of-circumstances assessment that is best
left in the first instance to the trial court") (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 569 (1980) (White, J., dissenting)).
142. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1421 (Beam, J., dissenting). "Judge Gibson's concur-
rence would contend that this objective standard transforms the inquiry into a legal
one ... To the contrary, we think that the Mendenhall test is much like a finding of
negligence, which, the Supreme Court has held, is subject to clearly erroneous re-
view." Id. (citations ommitted). Judge Beam also noted that the problem of deter-
mining whether mixed questions of law and fact are to be treated as questions of law
or of fact for purposes of appellate review, sometimes turns on a determination that,
"as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better posi-
tioned than another to decide the issue in question." Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). The dissent then referred to Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2458-59 (1990), where the Supreme Court held that the ap-
propriate standard of review raised by a Rule 1 violation is the abuse of discretion
standard. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1421 (Beam,J., dissenting). "Familiar with the issues
and litigants, the district court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal
the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard." Id. (quoting Cooter
& Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2459).
143. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
144. Lee, supra note 33, at 236.
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will make an independent judgment as to whether there was a
seizure.145 Individuals who live in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth or
Seventh Circuits, however, are faced with the task of convincing the
appellate court that the district court made a clear error. 146
The crux of the problem is that the Supreme Court has not de-
cided the issue. 147 The stakes are high as defendants' fundamental
constitutional rights are at stake. Although charged with a crime,
offenders still retain constitutional rights. These rights include con-
sistent treatment by the court system and uniform constitutional pro-
tection. Thus, it is time for the Supreme Court to give much needed
clarification and guidance.
B. The Solution: Clearly Erroneous Standard
It is undisputed that the seizure determination requires the district
court to find the historical facts and that these findings are reviewed
for clear error. The controversy arises over the review of factual
inferences and the characterization of historical facts. McKines incor-
rectly characterized the seizure determination as a question for in-
dependent review. Instead, the seizure determination should be
reviewed for clear error with proper deference being given to the
district court.
1. The Seizure Determination Is a Question of Fact
The Supreme Court should review seizure determinations for
145. See supra notes 97-105.
146. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
147. Despite ample opportunity, the Supreme Court has not adopted one stan-
dard of review. However, there are various Supreme Court opinions which illustrate
the point of view of individual justices on the issue. For example, in United States v.
Mendenhall, Justice Stewart stated that certain conduct "cannot, as a matter of law,
amount to a seizure of that person." 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1980) (Stewart, J., con-
curring). In INS v. Delgado, Justice Powell stated that the determination of whether a
reasonable person would think himself free to leave "turns on a difficult characteriza-
tion of fact and law." 466 U.S. 210, 221 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). However,
there are other statements indicating that other justices would treat the issue as a
question of fact. For example, Justice White has referred to the seizure question as a
question of fact that should be decided by the district court. See Mendenhal, 466 U.S.
at 569 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the seizure question is "a fact-bound ques-
tion . . . that is best left in the first instance to the trial court"). Justice Blackmun has
referred a seizure finding as a factual finding. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 516
n. 1 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to Royer's possible belief that he was
free to leave as a "finding"). Thus, in reality, the Court has not decided the issue.
In McKines, ChiefJudge Lay criticized the Court's attempt to sort out precedent
by debating whether the Supreme Court used the term "find" or "conclude." McK-
ines, 933 F.2d at 1431 n.2. (Lay, C.J., dissenting). "To me, this is nothing more than
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clear error because the issue is a question of fact. The Court has
long recognized that the primary responsibility for making factual
determinations lies with the district court, even when the process re-
quires more than findings about historical events. 148 Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a) provides little guidance to distinguish law from
fact. Yet treating issues that are purely factual in nature as factual
questions is commonplace.t4 9
The seizure determination involves a case-specific inquiry into
what happened. The district court judge must decide the who, what,
when, and where by resolving conflicting testimony, determining
witness credibility, and then assessing the coercive effect of police
conduct as a whole. This inquiry involves making a characterization
based on historical facts and inferences. This characterization is
nontechnical in nature and is made without any reference to the law.
Factual inferences, if purely factual, are questions of fact.150 Thus,
the seizure determination is not a conclusion of law, but a question
of fact.
2. Constitutional Issues Do Not Amount to Legal Issues
Clearly erroneous is the correct standard because the mere pres-
ence of constitutional issues does not authorize de novo review. In
McKines, Judge Lay asserted that the ultimate question of whether
there has been a seizure under the Constitution always has been, and
always will be, a question of law.'1t However, no clear authority ex-
148. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982); Commissioner
v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
149. See note 150.
150. Inferences drawn from the facts are reviewed for clear error. See Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856 (1982) (stating that drawing
inferences from the facts should be done by the trial court); Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286-87 (1982) (holding that broad factual inferences which are
determinative of a case are not questions of law); see also, Childress, supra note 22, at
143. "Even those inferences which aren't easily pegged as 'law' or 'fact' are likely to
be treated as mixed questions, though often greater deference is given where it's
more fact than law." Id. An exception exists for cases which are based on purely
documentary evidence, in which case, appellate courts have a general power to draw
inferences. But when courts phrase the issue as a factual inference, proper deference
should be accorded the trial court. Id. at 144.
151. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1431 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). Judge Lay's exact words
were: "Whether there is a seizure turns on the totality of the factual circumstances
involved, but the ultimate question of whether the facts constitute an arrest or seizure
under the Constitution always has been and always will be a question of law for a
reviewing court." Id.
There is no difference between "[wihether there is a seizure based on the totality
of the factual circumstances" and the question of whether the "facts constitute an
arrest or seizure under the Constitution." It is the same question. As Judge Beam
pointed out, the ultimate consitutional question is whether the Fourth Amendment
has been violated, not whether the facts consitute a seizure. If there has been a
19921
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ists to support Judge Lay's assertion that the seizure determination
is, and always has been, a question of law. Indeed, courts disagree
about how to characterize the seizure question.152 It is unlikely that
the circuit courts would repeatedly debate the proper standard of
review if it were as self-evident as Judge Lay asserts.
Judge Lay also used the words "ultimate" and "under the constitu-
tion. "153 Simply because a factual finding is dispositive of a constitu-
tional issue does not mean that the finding is a legal question. Past
decisions illustrate that the mere presence of constitutional issues
does not mandate de novo review.154 Pullman-Standard v. Swint spe-
cifically rejected the notion that facts are divided into ultimate and
subsidiary categories.155 Thus, there is no authority for labeling the
seizure determination a legal question merely because it is ultimately
dispositive of the seizure issue.
Moreover, the seizure issue does not fall within the limited excep-
tion carved out in Bose. In Bose, 156 the Supreme Court held that in-
dependent review of First Amendment actual malice findings is
appropriate even though the underlying issues are essentially fac-
tual.15 7 Bose offered a comprehensive rationale for the independent
judgment rule asserted peculiar to the First Amendment that does
not apply to Fourth Amendment seizure.158 In Bose, the Supreme
Court stated that some factual questions should be subject to de
novo review because their impact on future cases is too great to en-
seizure, a finding that the Fourth Amendment has been violated depends upon
whether the seizure is supported by reasonable suspicion. See id. at 1420 n.7. (Beam,
J., dissenting).
152. Courts are struggling to label these issues. One court applied the de novo
standard to statements and acts of parties that resulted in the seizure, labeling the
issue as a question of law. While other courts adopting a "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard labeled the same determination a question of fact. See United States v. Montilla,
928 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 421 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 214 (1990) United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1989).
Other de novo courts have found the question of law to be whether the Fourth
Amendment was violated. See United States v. Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1092 (8th
Cir. 1988). Yet another court found the legal conclusion to be whether the seizure
was lawful. Maragh, 894 F.2d at 421.
In McKines, the court labeled the question of seizure to be a legal characteriza-
tion. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1424 (Gibson, J., concurring specially). The dissent in
McKines argued that the district court's determination was essentially one of fact,
therefore, the proper standard of review was clearly erroneous. Id. at 1422 (Beam,J.,
dissenting).
153. Id. at 1431 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
154. See supra note 76.
155. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 nn.14-16 (1982).
156. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).
157. Id. at 508.
158. Monaghan, supra note 39, at 230.
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trust them finally to the judgment of the trial court. 159 First Amend-
ment libel cases are decided, not on the totality of the circumstances,
but on controlling First Amendment norms. The courts examine the
evidence, marshal the facts, and then apply First Amendment norms
that are dispositive of the case. 160
On the other hand, the seizure determination is case-specific. The
process involves examining the evidence in that particular case. The
judge or jury does not compare the facts to controlling Fourth
Amendment norms but instead makes a judgment on the facts as
presented. 16 1 In seizure cases, the decision that the judge or jury
reaches has an impact on that criminal defendant alone. The deci-
sion does not, and properly should not, affect future seizure cases.
There is no risk of a judge or jury erroneously deciding a case that
will bind future cases. Thus, the reasoning of Bose does not apply to
seizure cases.
3. District Court Is Best Suited to Determine Seizure Questions
The Supreme Court should adopt the clearly erroneous standard
because the district court judge is best suited to determine whether a
seizure occurred. 16 2 The distinction between fact and law often
turns on a determination that one judicial actor is better positioned
than another to make the decision.163 The judicial system allocates
responsibility based on which court is best able to decide the issues.
This allocation reflects the need for judicial efficiency within the sys-
tem. There is no imperative that a properly fixed characterization
control allocation of functions.164 The real issue is allocative: which
decision maker should decide the issue.165
159. Bose, 466 U.S. at 505.
160. Id. at 509-10 n.28.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), where the
Court noted certain factors which might indicate a seizure:
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of sev-
eral officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of
the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.
Id.
But, as the Court suggested, these factors might indicate a seizure. They are fac-
tors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances. The presence of one or
more of these factors does not indicate a seizure per se.
162. See United States v. McKines 933 F.2d at 1412, 1422 (8th Cir.) (en banc)
(Beam, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 593 (1991) (arguing that the district
court is best suited to determine whether a seizure occurred).
163. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1988); Miller v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
164. Monaghan, supra note 39, at 234.
165. Id. at 237.
1992]
27
Westby: Fourth Amendment Seizure: The Proper Standard for Appellate Revie
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The seizure determination is a close call.16 6 The McKines court
was split six to four.167 The Supreme Court cases were similiarly
split.168 When the moment comes for determining whether, under
the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt
she was free to leave, the district court judge is best suited for the
job. She has heard the evidence, viewed the demeanor of the wit-
nesses, and is in the best position to assess what happened. The
seizure determination is based on the record as a whole, not on one
or more specific articulable facts.169 The issue depends on the multi-
plicity of relevant factual elements and their various combinations.
The Supreme Court has found this justification for deference to the
trial court. 170 Thus, primary weight in the seizure determination
should be given to the district court's findings.'
7'
The approach adopted by McKines breaks the seizure determina-
tion into a two-step process. The historical facts are established by
the district court. McKines asserts that these facts, taken as a whole,
become a question of law to be reviewed de novo. 172 Simply charac-
terizing a collection of facts as a legal issue does not force those fac-
tual findings into the "law" category.17 Nevertheless, regardless of
166. See McKines, 933 F.2d at 1415 (Beam, J.) (defining Fourth Amendment
seizure as difficult); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 221 (1984) (Powell,J., concurring)
(stating that whether an incident resulted in a Fourth Amendment seizure to be a
close one).
167. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1412 (Beam, J.).
168. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (unanimous Court); INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (7-2 decision); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)
(6-3 decision); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (5-4 decision).
169. See generally, Cooper, supra note 41, at 650-51. This article justifies leaving
certain issues in the trial court because trial judges are unable to make findings suffi-
ciently detailed to communicate the full factual basis for the decision of the court of
appeals. It argues that conclusions spring more from the trial judge's familiarity with
the entire record rather than from any specific articulable fact. Id.
170. In a much quoted passage, the Supreme Court stated that the issue of
whether a transfer constitutes a gift is a question of fact that should be decided by the
lower court:
Decision of the issue presented in these cases must be based ultimately on
the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the main-
springs of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case. The non-
technical nature of the statutory standard, the close relationship of it to the
data of practical human experience, and the multiplicity of relevant factual
elements, with their various combinations, creating the necessity of ascrib-
ing the proper force to each, confirm us in our conclusion that primary
weight in this area must be given to the conclusions of the trier of fact.
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
171. In McKines, a magistrate made the initial determination and these findings
were adopted by the district court. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1426 (Gibson, J., concurring
specially).
172. Id.
173. If characterizing the facts as legal issues pushes factual questions into the law
category, many areas of law are being erroneously reviewed. See, e.g., Schneckloth v.
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the label attached to these facts, the district court is still in the best
position to make the determination. There is no way for a district
court to sufficiently detail its findings to communicate the full factual
basis for its decision to the court of appeals.17 4 The judge cannot
spell out each portion of the testimony of each witness. The record
cannot adequately reflect a witness' tone of voice or demeanor.t 75
Moreover, sifting through the evidence to make an assessment of
the facts is a departure from the appellate court's traditional role of
interpreting the law.176 This departure is justified when the law is
technical, uncertain, needs interpretation, or includes sensitive is-
sues of social or political policy, areas which an appellate court is
particularly suited to decide.177 Instead of making a searching in-
quiry into case-specific matters of fact, the appellate court's time is
better spent developing the law.178 Thus, based on allocating re-
sponsibility where it belongs, the seizure determination should be
left with the district court that is charged with making factual
determinations.
4. Clearly Erroneous Standard Promotes Judicial Efficiency
The clearly erroneous standard would avoid duplication of the dis-
trict court's efforts by the court of appeals. The duplication of effort
resulting from application of the de novo standard would divert a
large amount ofjudicial resources. The potential for a favorable re-
sult in the appellate court will undoubtedly increase the rate of ap-
peals. Increasing the number of appeals mandates a balancing of
functions between judicial actors.179
Moreover, the approach adopted by McKines will result in an extra
burden on the district court judge. It is reasonable to assume that
courts of appeals will insist on more elaborate findings in order to
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (determining whether the totality of the
circumstances indicates that consent is voluntary is reviewed for clear error); Duber-
stein, 363 U.S. at 291 (determining whether transfers amount to a gift is reviewed for
clear error).
174. See Cooper, supra note 41, at 654. "The chore of such articulation would
itself be considerable. More important, the tasks of assessing credibility and drawing
inferences are not independent." Id.
175. Realistically, when an appellate court makes an independent seizure determi-
nation, it can only assess the totality of the record preserved for appeal.
176. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 50-59 and acompanying text.
178. This is especially true in light of the rule that district court opinions are not
binding on other district courts, even in the same district. See Lee, supra note 33, at
250 n.100.
179. See Cooper, supra note 41, at 649. Mere reduction in the number of appeals
is not in itself a virtue. Id. at 651. But if the judiciary cannot increase appellate
capacity to the point needed, then it should adopt a standard of review that sifts out
all but the extreme claims of error. See id. at 651-52.
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exercise a more searching review. The district court judge would
have to make specific findings regarding every detail of the eviden-
tiary hearing.180 Thus, for the preservation ofjudicial resources, the
Supreme Court should adopt the clearly erroneous standard.
5. Independent Review Does Not Ensure "More Correct" Decisions
Clearly erroneous is the correct standard of review because there
is no benefit from federal appellate courts second-guessing district
court seizure determinations. Appellate courts are not charged with
deciding cases as well as possible. De novo review of the seizure de-
termination does not ensure correct, or "more correct," decisions,
nor is there any guarantee that the appellate court decisions will pro-
duce greater satisfaction among the litigants.tat
There is a false notion that the greater the number of courts that
look at an issue, the greater the possibility of a "correct" decision.18 2
In reality, this review only adds, at a minimum, three more judicial
actors who are not as familiar with the facts and who could just as
likely reach the wrong result. The Supreme Court has specifically
rejected the theory that findings of an appellate court are likely to be
any more reliable than the findings reached by the trial judge.183 De-
termining whether a person was seized requires the same process in
both the district and appellate courts. Thus, duplication of the dis-
trict court's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contrib-
ute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge
cost of judicial resources.18 4
180. See supra note 174-75 and accompanying text.
181. There is commentary on both sides of this proposition. Compare Paul D. Car-
rington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of the Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L.
REV. 507, 527 (1969) (asserting that the tempo of work of appellate courts allows for
reflection and instruction not available to trial court judges) with Charles A. Wright,
The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 781 (1957) (asserting
that appellate judges as a group are not wiser than trial judges).
182. See Monaghan, supra note 39, at 268.
183. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Justice Rehnquist argued,
it is not clear to me that the "de novo" findings of appellate courts ... are
likely to be any more reliable than the findings reached by trial judges .... I
believe that the primary result will be [the majority carved out a narrow
exception for first amendment libel cases] . . . only lessened confidence in
the judgments of lower courts and more entirely factbound appeals.
466 U.S. 485, 520 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
184. In Anderson v. Bessemer City, the Supreme Court held that a finding of discrimi-
nation is a finding of fact and therefore should be reviewed only for clear error. The
Court observed, the "rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not lim-
ited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make determinations of credibil-
ity .... Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very
likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination . Ander-
son v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985).
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6. De Novo Standard Does Not Ensure Consistent Application
McKines recognized that uniformity in the law is desirable, but the
factual nature of the seizure test makes uniformity unattainable. As
the Supreme Court cases demonstrate, imprecision in determining
whether a person has been seized is unavoidable since the test is
purely contextual.185 "Fact bound resolutions cannot be made uni-
form through appellate review, de novo or otherwise." 186 What con-
stitutes a restraint on one's liberty which leads a person to conclude
that he is not free to leave will vary with the police conduct involved
and with the setting in which the conduct occurred.18 7 The standard
of appellate review for seizure determinations should be deferential
precisely because it is so unlikely that there will be two identical
cases.
Some courts strongly argue that de novo is required to ensure con-
sistency among decisions.' 8 8 The circuits adopting this argument
have yet to establish just how de novo would ensure consistent deci-
sions. An independent assessment of the facts by the appellate court
does not guarantee consistency. Indeed, a primary responsibility of
appellate courts is to maintain uniformity and coherence of the law.
This responsibility is not triggered, however, if the only question
before the court is the significance of a particular and non-recurring
set of historical facts.189
The courts have not developed uniform, principled rules of law for
Fourth Amendment seizure determinations. Neither the district
court nor appellate court can dispose of a case by making reference
to a rule of law. 190 The Supreme Court has warned against trying to
formulate rules which guide the court in disposing of a case, stating:
We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distinguish-
185. This imprecision is inherent in the Mendenhall test. See McKines, 933 F.2d at
1416 (Beam, J.) (stating that Supreme Court cases themselves are not consistent); see
also Edwin Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When Fourth
Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437 (1988); Thomas K.
Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition of a Seizure, What Is a "Seizure" of a
Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 619 (1990).
186. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1422 (Beam, J., dissenting) (quoting Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2460 (1990)).
187. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988).
188. See, e.g., McKines, 933 F.2d at 1426 (Gibson, J., concurring specially) (finding
Maragh's reasoning compelling); United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417-18
(D.C. Cir.) (holding that seizure test is an objective legal test and that de novo en-
sures consistent application), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 214 (1990).
189. See Rexnord, Inc. v. United States, 940 F.2d 1094, 1097 (7th Cir. 1991)
("considerations which favor a de novo standard, such as the desire to create a uni-
form rule, are not present here since no single rule could embrace the varied fact
patterns which may arise); Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1986) (dis-
cussing deferential review of mixed questions).
190. McKines, 933 F.2d at 1419 (Beam, J.).
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ing a consensual encounter from a seizure or for determining when
a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop .... [T]here
will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much
variation that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence
or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to the
question whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.19 1
Any rule formulated by an appellate court would be highly contex-
tual and thus have no precedential value. It is inconceivable that a
future case would contain identical facts. A future court would be
left clueless. 192
The more appropriate role of the appellate court is to play a su-
pervisory role, ensuring that proper and consistent procedures are
being used throughout the circuit. The appellate court should re-
view the decision to ensure that the district court has examined the
totality of the circumstances and has considered the circumstances as
a reasonable person would. This will eliminate the possibility of ar-
bitrary decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and
put this issue to rest. If the Supreme Court is to resolve the conflict
in a manner consistent with the proper understanding of the appel-
late function, it must adopt the clearly erroneous standard for appel-
late review of district court seizure findings. 193 However, until it
does so, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is free to reconsider its
position. For the reasons discussed above, it would be wise for them
to do so.
Heidi M. Westby
191. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506-07 (1983).
192. Lee, supra note 33, at 265 (posing a similar argument in the case of making a
determination of discriminatory intent).
193. Id. at 291.
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